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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
section 78-2-2. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
May a trial Court issue a permanent protective order based upon the assertion of 
the Plaintiff that she is afraid of the Defendant. This after the following question by that 
Court; "You're afraid of him?" (Transcript of hearing January 22, 2004 page 5 line 11). 
May a trial Court issue a permanent protective order where the Defendant nor his 
witnesses are permitted to testify? Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County. 51 P.2d 
645 Utah 1935 and Pangea Technologies. Inc. v. Internet Promotions. Inc. 2004 WL 
1092239 Utah,2004 May 18, 2004. 
May a trial Court issue a permanent protective order where the Defendant was not 
served with the ex-parte protective order but came to court voluntarily after learning from 
another source that a hearing was on the Court docket? Riggins v. District Court of Salt 
Lake County. 51 P.2d 645 Utah 1935, Article I section 7 Utah Constitution. 
May a trial Court deprive a Defendant of the right to keep and bear arms through 
the issuance of a permanent protective order without due process of law? 
The standard of review is for correctness for the standards for issuing a permanent 
protective order. The standard of review for a taking without due process of law is 
correctness. 
Whether the trial court selected the correct legal definition to apply to the facts of 
a case presents a question of law. See C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 
47, 54 (Utah Ct.App.1995). Legal correctness Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422 Utah, 1999. 
Correctness (of the statute) under article 1 section 11 Wood v. University of Utah Medical 
Center, 67 P.3d 436 Utah,2002. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Constitution of Utah Article 1 section 7 due process of law, Constitution of Utah 
Article 1 section 11 requires that the Courts be open to the Defendant. Utah Code 
Annotated sections 30-6-et seq domestic violence. The Constitution requires due process 
of law for the taking of life liberty and property. The Court shall consider factors in 
making a protective order permanent, Utah code Annotated section 30-6-et seq, and 
USCS 18 Section 922 (for reference). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The trial Court herein issued a permanent protective order upon the representation 
by the Plaintiff that she was afraid of the Defendant. This despite the request by the 
Defendant to be allowed to call witnesses to testify, that the event that the Plaintiff wrote 
in her ex-parte request for the issuance of a protective order, did not occur. As a result of 
the issuance of a permanent protective order, Kerri Fairer is not permitted to possess a 
firearm or go hunting, something that he has enjoyed. 
FACTS 
The parties had h<vn man toil, ihey have a two year old child together. The piiidrv. 
divorce was final on or about September 5, 200't 1 \w | Vkiulant, Kerry Farrer has 
remarried, iiir PI.nniil]'sought and was granted an ex-parte protective order a>>ninsi fin 
defendant i he Defendant was m^ t- - ie ex-parte protective order, The 
. . J_ iiovi oi ihe hearing to make the protective K .*. • nu, -:. * 
partj \\ho rouund - \«/iliIi' t mime cow t docket. 
Kerry Farrer appeared with counsel at t order hearing. There he 
brought two witnesses. Through counsel he asserted that the statemei - J 
the Verified Petition for Protective < > * *. \K fendant requested that the 
J.-. LCbimiony the Defendant and his witnesses. -tened to a 
recitation of events by f !»•• l^uitfil], asked he, a sue was afraid of the Defendant, 
(1 lanscript of the hearing pages 4 and 5) and the • • •- - iotective order was granted. 
i L a \ ; . AUTHOF v AND I )ISCl 'SSiON 
CONSTITUTION O! LlAHAKiiCLi - , OF RIGHT" 
55 1 H (Mirts ope- Redress of injuries. j 
Mi ^mrt* shall i'-i open, and every person, for an («:ju,; done to ftim in Ms person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in,, this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County., 51 P.2d 645 Utah 1.935 reads in part 
.." Due process of law requncs thai woi^c «. . A to the persons whose rights are 
to be affected. It "hears before it condemns, procee f :- ' enders judgment 
only after trial." It is difficult to believe that the Le npower the court 
to find "that the material allegations of the petition or con without giving 
*:K- defendant an opportunity to be heard. It is elementary mat a court may not make 
ings binding upon a defendant without a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard. An act 
h
 authorized a court to make findings binding upon, a defendant without giving him. an 
;t\ :. be heard must fail. 
Affirmatively cited for this proposition in, Pangea Technologies, Inc. v. Internet 
Promotions, Inc. 2004 WL 1092239 Utah,2004 May 18, 2004. 
Despite his request to be heard (transcript of hearing page 2 lines 22-25 through page 3 
line 6 and page 5 line 25 through page 6 line3). Mr. Farrer nor his witnesses were 
permitted to testify, nor present any evidence. 
Without any due process Mr. Fairer's opportunity to hunt, to posses any firearm is 
taken from him, and he becomes subject to state and federal firearms violations if he ever 
does. 18 USCS section 922 provides that it is unlawful for anyone who is subject to a 
court order restraining him from "harassing, stalking, or threatening . . ." from possessing 
a firearm or even ammunition. He is precluded from obtaining a concealed weapons 
license under Utah Code Annotated section 53-5-704 
Further, Mr. Farrer had never been served with the ex-parte order nor notice of 
hearing. Utah Constitution Article I section 7 provides: "No person shall be deprived of 
Life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
The entire reason for the issuance of the protective order is found on page 5 lines 
22-25 where it reads "The Court: Well, Fm going to make this order permanent because 
she's - she says she's afraid of him and she doesn't want him to come to her house or 
bother her." 
A restraining order would more appropriately address "she doesn't want him to 
come to her house and bother her". 
The protective order statutes are broad by design. Yet they require findings of fact 
that meet the sufficiency of the Utah Code, those findings are not found in this case. 
Mr. Farrer also challenges the constitutionality of the broad sweep of those 
statutes. If all that is required for the issuance of a permanent protective order is an 
affirmative answer by the Plaintiff, to a question by the Court, then the statute is 
overbroad and should be reviewed for correctness under Article 1 section 11 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. See Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 67 
P.3d 436 Utah,2002. The Court asked "Your afraid of him?" (Transcript page 5 line 11). 
She answered "Yeah" (page 5 line 12). Then added "He can't control his temper" (page 5 
line 12). No offer of proof, no foundation, no opportunity for the Defendant to be heard. 
In fact the Court stated the reason for the grant of the permanent protective order was: 
"The Court: Well, I'm going to make this order permanent because she's - she says she's 
afraid of him and she doesn't want him to come to her house or bother her." With that 
statement Mr. Fairer's opportunity to hunt, to posses any firearm is taken from him. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant herein seeks a ruling from this Court setting aside the Permanent 
Protective Order of the District Court. Direction to the District Courts on the standards 
required to issue such broad reaching orders. Such other and further relief as is just and 
appropriate. 
Respectfully submitted this /£_ day of August, 2004. 
Cleve Hatch/Attorney for 
the Defendant/Appellant 
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2004 WL 1092239 
94 P.3d 257, 2004 WL 1092239 (Utah), 500 Utah Adv. 
(Cite as: 2004 WL 1092239 (Utah)) 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
PANGEA TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
v. 
INTERNET PROMOTIONS, INC., Defendant. 
Zions First National Bank, Garnishee and Appellant. 
No. 20020445. 
May 18,2004. 
Background: Judgment creditor brought claim 
against debtor's bank as garnishee, based on bank's 
allegedly improper release of funds from debtor's 
accounts that were subject to writ of garnishment. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, 
Leon A. Dever, J., entered judgment without 
hearing in favor of creditor, and garnishee appealed. 
Holding: The Supreme Court, Nehring, J., held 
that bank was entitled to evidentiary hearing on 
creditor's claim that bank was liable for release of 
funds subject to garnishment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
[1] Appeal and Error €=*842(1) 
30k842(l) Most Cited Cases 
The interpretation of a procedural rule is a legal 
issue which the Supreme Court reviews anew 
without deference to the district court's 
interpretation. 
[2] Garnishment €=158 
189kl58 Most Cited Cases 
[2] Garnishment €=>166.1 
189k 166.1 Most Cited Cases 
Judgment creditor's post-judgment claim that bank, 
as holder of judgment debtor's funds subject to 
Copr. © West 2004 No ( 
Page 1 
». 3, 2004 UT 40 
garnishment, was liable for improper release of 
funds to debtor constituted "new matter" for which 
bank was entitled to evidentiary hearing on merits, 
under rule requiring that new matters shall be tried 
in same manner as other issues, since bank was not 
placed on notice that creditor was seeking judgment 
against bank during underlying action on debt. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 64D(i). 
[3] Constitutional Law €=>312(2) 
92k312(2) Most Cited Cases 
A garnishee is a stranger to the principal case 
between a creditor and debtor and is an involuntary 
participant in the garnishment proceeding, and thus, 
such structural circumstance imposes unique due 
process demands on the garnishment procedures, 
especially in cases where the creditor seeks to 
obtain a judgment from the garnishee. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 7. 
[4] Constitutional Law €=>251.6 
92k251.6 Most Cited Cases 
Fundamental features of due process require that 
notice be given to the person whose rights are to be 
affected; it hears before it condemns, proceeds upon 
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 7. 
Craig A. Hoggan, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
David M. McGrath, Robert A. Goodman, Salt Lake 
City, for garnishee. 
NEHRING, Justice: 
*1 \ 1 This appeal presents us with the question 
of whether a garnishee is entitled to a hearing after 
the plaintiff in the principal case replies to the 
garnishee's answers to interrogatories and seeks to 
have the garnishee held liable to the plaintiff for the 
property sought to be garnished. We reverse the 
district court's denial of a hearing to garnishee 
Zions First National Bank and vacate the judgment 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
tp://print.westlaw.com/delivery.html?dest==atp&dataid=AOOSSRnnnnnno 
2004 WL 1092239 
94 P.3d 257, 2004 WL 1092239 (Utah), 500 Utah Adv. Re 
(Cite as: 2004 WL 1092239 (Utah)) 
against Zions in favor of the plaintiff and judgment 
creditor in the principal action, Pangea 
Technologies, Inc. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
% 2 Pangea obtained a judgment against Internet 
Promotions, Inc., for $65,641. Believing that Zions 
held money belonging to Internet Promotions, 
Pangea served Zions with a writ of garnishment. As 
authorized by rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the writ ordered Zions to hold all money 
in Internet Promotions' accounts up to the amount 
of the judgment and instructed Zions to answer 
interrogatories about funds held by the bank which 
belonged to Internet Promotions. Zions answered 
the interrogatories the next day, telling Pangea that 
$10,089 remained in Internet Promotions' account. 
T[ 3 However, before Zions froze the funds, they 
were transferred to the personal account of Internet 
Promotions' president. After discovering this, Zions 
amended its interrogatory answers to disclose the 
transfer. Pangea responded by filing a reply to 
Zions1 amended answers as permitted by Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 64D(i). Pangea asked the district 
court to charge Zions with liability for the amount 
of the transferred funds. Pangea also requested a 
hearing on the issue of Zions' liability. 
Tf 4 The district court granted the judgment against 
Zions without conducting a hearing, finding that the 
money had been "improperly releas[ed]." Zions 
asked the district court to reconsider, citing 
language in rule 64D(i) which, it contended, 
mandated a hearing. The court denied Zions' motion 
and entered judgment against Zions for $10,089, the 
amount of the transferred money, and an additional 
$2,370.30 in attorney fees and costs. The district 
court did not disclose its reasons for awarding 
attorney fees. Zions appealed. 
[1] If 5 Zions' appeal is confined to the question of 
whether the district court erred when it declined to 
hear the merits of Pangea's claim that Zions was 
liable for the transferred money. We do not address 
whether Zions was, in fact, liable. So presented, 
Zions' appeal concerns an interpretation of a rule of 
procedure. This is a legal issue which we review 
anew without deference to the district court's 
Copr. © West 2004 No Clai 
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interpretation. Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, % 
8,29P.3dl225. [FN1] 
ANALYSIS 
[2] [3] T[ 6 The seizure of property by garnishment 
is governed by rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(i). A garnishee is a 
stranger to the principal case and an involuntary 
participant in the garnishment proceeding. This 
structural circumstance imposes unique due process 
demands on garnishment procedures. The need for 
heightened sensitivity to due process is particularly 
evident where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to obtain a 
judgment from a garnishee. We conclude that rule 
64D(i) requires that a garnishee be afforded a 
hearing before it can be found liable to a plaintiff 
and have a judgment entered against it. 
*2 If 7 Rule 64D(i) reads as follows: 
The plaintiff or defendant may, within 10 days 
after the service of any answers to 
interrogatories, file and serve upon the garnishee 
and the other party to the principal action a reply 
to the whole or any part thereof and may also 
allege any matters which would charge the 
garnishee with liability except that all claims for 
exemptions to garnishment or non-ownership of 
property garnisheed shall be resolved under the 
procedures as otherwise provided for in 
Subdivision (h) herein. Such new matter in reply 
shall be taken as denied and the matter thus at 
issue shall be tried in the same manner as other 
issues of like nature. Judgment shall be entered 
upon the verdict or finding the same as if the 
garnishee had answered according to such verdict 
or finding. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(i) (emphasis added). 
[4] f^ 8 Pangea defends the district court's 
determination that Zions was not entitled to a 
hearing on the grounds that its reply to Zions' 
amended interrogatories contained no "new matter" 
and thus did not trigger the need for a trial. We 
disagree. The "new matter" raised in Pangea's reply 
was its assertion that Zions was liable for the money 
transferred out of Internet Promotions' account. 
Pangea would have us narrowly read "new matter" 
to include only new facts. This interpretation would 
inevitably cause garnishees to be deprived of due 
process as guaranteed by article I, section 7 of the 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
. • i ? - „ . u^iMoCf=ntnAdataid=A0055800000080930004802361... 8/10/2004 
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94 P.3d 257, 2004 WL 1092239 (Utah), 500 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT 40 
(Cite as: 2004 WL 1092239 (Utah)) 
Page 3 
Utah Constitution. We long ago succinctly 
summarized the fundamental features of due 
process, observing that it "requires that notice be 
given to the person whose rights are to be 
affected. It hears before it condemns, proceeds 
upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after 
trial." Riggins v. Dist Court of Salt Lake County, 
89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645, 660 (1935) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
H 9 Until Pangea claimed in its reply that Zions 
was liable, Zions was not placed on notice that 
Pangea was seeking a judgment against Zions. If 
Pangea's reply is to square with due process, its 
request to find Zions liable must be construed as a 
"new matter," thereby entitling Zions to a trial "in 
the same manner as other issues of like nature." 
UtahR. Civ.P. 64D(i). 
^ 10 We have previously held that a judgment 
may not be taken against a garnishee who has not 
been served with a reply to the garnishee 
interrogatories. Remington Rand, Inc. v. O'Neil, 4 
Utah 2d 270, 293 P.2d 416, 417 (1956) {Remington 
I ) . When the Remington I litigants returned to this 
court a year later, we reiterated our commitment to 
the right of a garnishee to be heard before being at 
risk of having a judgment entered against it, stating, 
"the object of promoting justice requires that both 
sides to [the] controversy have a fair opportunity to 
present their claims on their merits. Otherwise, the 
main purposes of our courts of justice and our 
judicial system will be defeated." Remington Rand, 
Inc. v. O'Neil, 6 Utah 2d 182, 309 P.2d 368, 370 
(1957) (Remington II). 
*3 K 11 The reasoning of Remington II remains 
sound today. Accordingly, the district court's 
issuance of a judgment against garnishee Zions, 
absent a hearing, violated Zions' due process rights. 
We therefore reverse the district court* and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Because we reverse the district court on 
the legal question presented, within which 
the issue of attorney fees is subsumed, we 
do not reach this question. 
94 P.3d 257, 2004 WL 1092239 (Utah), 500 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT 40 
END OF DOCUMENT 
1f 12 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief 
Justice DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, and Justice 
PARRISH concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion. 
FN1. Zions also challenges the district 
court's award of attorney fees to Pangea. 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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ADDENDUM B 
§ 922. Unlawful acts 
(a) It shall be unlawful— 
(1) for any person— 
(A) except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed 
165 
18 USCS § 922 CRIMES & CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
dealer, to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or deal-
ing in firearms, or in the course of such business to ship, transport, or 
receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce; or 
(B) except a licensed importer or licensed manufacturer, to engage in 
the business of importing or manufacturing ammunition, or in the 
course of such business, to ship, transport, or receive any ammunition 
in interstate or foreign commerce; 
(2) for any importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector licensed under the 
provisions of this chapter [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.] to ship or transport 
in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm to any person other than a 
licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed col-
lector, except that— 
(A) this paragraph and subsection (b)(3) shall not be held to preclude 
a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed 
collector from returning a firearm or replacement firearm of the same 
kind and type to a person from whom it was received; and this 
paragraph shall not be held to preclude an individual from mailing a 
firearm owned in compliance with Federal, State, and local law to a 
licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed 
collector; 
(B) this paragraph shall not be held to preclude a licensed importer, 
licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer from depositing a firearm for 
conveyance in the mails to any officer, employee, agent, or watchman 
who, pursuant to the provisions of section 1715 of this title, is eligible 
to receive through the mails pistols, revolvers, and other firearms 
capable of being concealed on the person, for use in connection with his 
official duty; and 
(C) nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as applying in any 
manner in the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, or any possession of the United States differently than it would 
apply if the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
or the possession were in fact a State of the United States; 
(3) for any person other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector to transport into or receive in the 
State where he resides (or if the person is a corporation or other business 
entity, the State where it maintains a place of business) any firearm 
purchased or otherwise obtained by such person outside that State, except 
that this paragraph (A) shall not preclude any person who lawfully 
acquires a firearm by bequest or intestate succession in a State other than 
his State of residence from transporting the firearm into or receiving it in 
that State, if it is lawful for such person to purchase or possess such 
firearm in that State, (B) shall not apply to the transportation or receipt 
of a firearm obtained in conformity with subsection (b)(3) of this section, 
and (C) shall not apply to the transportation of any firearm acquired in 
any State prior to the effective date of this chapter [effective Dec. 16, 
1968]; 
(4) for any person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
166 
FIREARMS 18 USCS § 922 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector to transport in interstate or foreign 
commerce any destructive device, machinegun (as defined in section 5845 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 USCS § 5845]), short-barreled 
shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, except as specifically authorized by the 
Secretary consistent with public safety and necessity, 
(5) for any person (other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector) to transfei, sell, trade, give, trans-
port, or deliver any firearm to any person (other than a licensed importer, 
licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector) who the 
transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe does not reside in (or 
if the person is a corporation or other business entity, does not maintain 
a place of business in) the State in which the transferor resides; except 
that this paragraph shall not apply to (A) the transfer, transportation, or 
delivery of a firearm made to carry out a bequest of a firearm to, or an 
acquisition by intestate succession of a fiiearm by, a person who is permit-
ted to acquire or possess a firearm under the laws of the State of his resi-
dence, and (B) the loan or rental of a firearm to any person for temporary 
use for lawful sporting purposes, 
(6) for any person in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisi-
tion of any firearm or ammunition from a licensed importer, licensed 
manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector, knowingly to make 
any false or fictitious oral or written statement or to furnish or exhibit any 
false, fictitious, or misrepresented identification, intended or likely to 
deceive such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector with respect to 
any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such 
firearm or ammunition under the provisions of this chapter [18 USCS 
§§921 et seq], 
(7) for any person to manufacture or import armor piercing ammunition, 
except that this paragraph shall not apply to— 
(A) the manufacture or importation of such ammunition for the use of 
the United States or any department or agency thereof or any State or 
any department agency, or political subdivision thereof, 
(B) the manufacture of such ammunition for the purpose of exporta-
tion, and 
(C) any manufacture or importation for the purposes of testing or 
experimentation authorized by the Secretary, 
(8) for any manufacturer or importer to sell or deliver armor piercing 
ammunition, except that this paragraph shall not apply to— 
(A) the sale or dehverv by a manufacturer or importer of such ammu-
nition for use of the United States or any department or agency thereof 
or any State or any department, agency, or political subdivision thereof, 
(B) the sale or delivery by a manufacturer or importer of such ammu-
nition for the purpose of exportation, 
(C) the sale or delivery by a manufacturer or importer of such ammu-
nition for the purposes of testing or experimenting authorized by the 
Secretary, and 
167 
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(9) for any person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector, who does not reside in any State to 
receive any firearms unless such receipt is for lawful sporting purposes. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector to sell or deliver— 
(1) any firearm or ammunition to any individual who the licensee knows 
or has reasonable cause to believe is less than eighteen years of age, and, 
if the firearm, or ammunition is other than a shotgun or rifle, or ammu-
nition for a shotgun or rifle, to any individual who the licensee knows or 
has reasonable cause to believe is less than twenty-one years of age; 
(2) any firearm to any person in any State where the purchase or posses-
sion by such person of such firearm would be in violation of any State law 
or any published ordinance applicable at the place of sale, delivery or 
other disposition, unless the licensee knows or has reasonable cause to 
believe that the purchase or possession would not be in violation of such 
State law or such published ordinance; 
(3) any firearm to any person who the licensee knows or has reasonable 
cause to believe does not reside in (or if the person is a corporation or 
other business entity, does not maintain a place of business in) the State 
in which the licensee's place of business is located, except that this 
paragraph (A) shall not apply to the sale or delivery of any rifle or shotgun 
to a resident of a State other than a State in which the licensee's place of 
business is located if the transferee meets in person with the transferor to 
accomplish the transfer, and the sale, delivery, and receipt fully comply 
with the legal conditions of sale in both such States (and any licensed 
manufacturer, importer or dealer shall be presumed, for purposes of this 
subparagraph, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have had 
actual knowledge of the State laws and published ordinances of both 
States), and (B) shall not apply to the loan or rental of a firearm to any 
person for temporary use for lawful sporting purposes; 
(4) to any person any destructive device, machinegun (as defined in sec-
tion 5845 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 USCS § 5845]), short-
barreled shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, except as specifically authorized 
by the Secretary consistent with public safety and necessity; and 
(5) any firearm or armor-piercing ammunition to any person unless the 
licensee notes in his records, required to be kept pursuant to section 923 
of this chapter, the name, age, and place of residence of such person if the 
person is an individual, or the identity and principal and local places of 
business of such person if the person is a corporation or other business 
entity. 
Paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of this subsection shall not apply to transac-
tions between licensed importers, licensed manufacturers, licensed dealers, 
and licensed collectors. Paragraph (4) of this subsection shall not apply to a 
sale or delivery to any research organization designated by the Secretary. 
(c) In any case not otherwise prohibited by this chapter [18 USCS §§ 921 et 
seq.j, a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer may sell 
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a firearm to a person who does not appear in person at the licensee's busi-
ness premises (other than another licensed importer, manufacturer, or 
dealer) only if— 
(1) the transferee submits to the transferor a sworn statement in the fol-
lowing form-
"Subject to penalties provided by law, I swear that, in the case of any 
firearm other than a shotgun or a rifle, I am twenty-one years or more 
of age, or that, in the case of a shotgun or a rifle, I am eighteen years 
or more of age, that I am not prohibited by the provisions of chapter 
44 of title 18, United States Code [18 USCS §§921 et seq ], from 
receiving a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce, and that my 
receipt of this firearm will not be in violation ot any statute of the State 
and published ordinance applicable to the locality in which I reside 
Further, the true title, name, and address of the principal law enforce-
ment officer of the locality to which the firearm will be delivered are 
Signature Date M 
and containing blank spaces for the attachment of a true copy of any 
permit or other information required pursuant to such statute or published 
ordinance; 
(2) the transferor has, prior to the shipment or delivery of the firearm, 
forwarded by registered or certified mail (return receipt requested) a copy 
of the sworn statement, together with a description of the firearm, in a 
form prescribed by the Secretary, to the chief law enforcement officer of 
the transferee's place of residence, and has received a return receipt 
evidencing deliver} of the statement or has had the statement returned 
due to the refusal of the named addressee to accept such letter in accor-
dance with United States Post Office Department [United States Postal 
Service] regulations; and 
(3) the transferor has delayed shipment or delivery for a period of at least 
seven days following receipt of the notification of the acceptance or refusal 
of delivery of the statement. 
A copy of the sworn statement and a copy of the notification to the local law 
enforcement officer, together with evidence of receipt or rejection of that 
notification shall be retained by the licensee as a part of the iecords required 
to be kept under section 923(g) 
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any 
firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that such person— 
(1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of. a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, 
(2) is a fugitive from justice, 
(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as 
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U S C 802)), 
(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to 
any mental institution, 
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(5) who, being an alien, is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable 
conditions; 
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced his 
citizenship; or 
(8) is subject to a court order that restrains such person from harassing, 
stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of 
such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would 
place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner 
or child, except that this paragraph shall only apply to a court order 
that— 
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual 
notice, and at which such person had the opportunity to participate; 
and 
(B)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to 
the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or 
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or 
child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. 
This subsection shall not apply with respect to the sale or disposition of a 
firearm or ammunition to a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector who pursuant to subsection (b) of sec-
tion 925 of this chapter is not precluded from dealing in firearms or ammu-
nition, or to a person who has been granted relief from disabilities pursuant 
to subsection (c) of section 925 of this chapter. 
(e) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to deliver or cause to be 
delivered to any common or contract carrier for transportation or shipment 
in interstate or foreign commerce, to persons other than licensed importers, 
licensed manufacturers, licensed dealers, or licensed collectors, any package 
or other container in which there is any firearm or ammunition without 
written notice to the carrier that such firearm or ammunition is being 
transported or shipped; except that any passenger who owns or legally pos-
sesses a firearm or ammunition being transported aboard any common or 
contract carrier for movement with the passenger in interstate or foreign 
commerce may deliver said firearm or ammunition into the custody of the 
pilot, captain, conductor or operator of such common or contract carrier for 
the duration of the trip without violating any of the provisions of this chapter 
[18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.]. No common or contract carrier shall require or 
cause any label, tag, or other written notice to be placed on the outside of 
any package, luggage, or other container that such package, luggage, or other 
container contains a firearm. 
(f)(1) It shall be unlawful for any common or contract carrier to transport 
or deliver in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm or ammunition 
with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the shipment, trans-
portation, or receipt thereof would be in violation of the provisions of this 
chapter [18 USCS §§921 et seq.]. 
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(2) It shall be unlawful for any common or contract carrier to deliver in 
interstate or foreign commerce any firearm without obtaining written 
acknowledgement of receipt from the recipient of the package or other 
container in which there is a firearm. 
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person— 
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 
(2) who is a fugitive from justice; 
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as 
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)): 
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been com-
mitted to a mental institution; 
(5) who, being an alien, is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable 
conditions; 
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced his 
citizenship; or 
(8) who is subject to a court order that— 
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual 
notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; 
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an 
intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or 
person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate 
partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and 
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat 
to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or 
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or 
child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury, 
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or af-
fecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce. 
(h) It shall be unlawful for an> individual, who to that individual's knowl-
edge and while being emploved for an> person described in any paragraph 
of subsection (g) of this section, in the course of such employment— 
(1) to receive, possess, or transport anv firearm or ammunition in or af-
fecting interstate or foreign commerce: or 
(2) to receive anv firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
(0 It shall be unlawful for any person to transport or ship in interstate or 
foreign commerce, any stolen firearm or stolen ammunition, knowing or 
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